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A B S T R A C T
Condition-based maintenance is applied in various industries to monitor and control critical assets and to op-
timize maintenance eﬀorts. Its applicability to the oﬀshore wind energy industry has been considered for almost
20 years and has resulted in the development and implementation of solutions that have contributed to lower
cost of maintenance and increased asset availability. However, there is currently no public domain guidance
available that provides the information required to (i) prioritize systems for which condition monitoring would
generate highest value and to (ii) understand the parameters that need to be monitored by a speciﬁc system from
failure cause to failure mode. Both items are addressed in this paper, providing a clearly structured, risk-based
assessment methodology and corresponding results for state-of-the-art oﬀshore wind turbines. A total of 337
failure modes have been identiﬁed and analysed by experts representing approximately 70% of the European
oﬀshore wind market to assess potential beneﬁts of condition monitoring systems. Results may be used to target
the development of condition monitoring systems focusing on critical systems and to ﬁnd optimal O&M stra-
tegies by understanding failure paths of main oﬀshore wind turbine systems resulting in a lower cost of energy
and a more optimal risk-return balance.
1. Introduction
Deployment of oﬀshore wind power plants for electricity generation
is becoming more and more competitive in various regions around the
globe (Pineda and Pierre Tardieu, 2017). Its increasing contribution to
the overall energy mix emphasises the requirement to comply with
standards ensuring energy security at a price of electricity acceptable
for a society (European Commission, 2014), and produced in a safe and
environmentally sensitive manner. In the early years of oﬀshore wind
deployment, this demand was often not met. Examples are the Barrow,
North Hoyle, Scroby Sands or Kentish Flats wind farms (WFs) in the
United Kingdom (UK) that only delivered approximately 60–80% of the
electricity that could have been produced had the assets continuously
fulﬁlled the desired function (Feng et al., 2010). The main reasons for
this shortcoming were identiﬁed in early studies and are mainly: (i) a
low reliability of the wind turbines (WTs) (P. Tavner, 2012), (ii) un-
derestimation of access restrictions for conducting maintenance activ-
ities (GJW Van Bussel and Zaaijer, MB, 2001), (iii) non-availability of
specialised vessels for the aforementioned activities (Gerard Van Bussel
and Schöntag, 1997) and (iv) the application of corrective maintenance
– i.e. the initialization of maintenance activities in a reactive manner
after the fault of a component or part within the WT system (Jannie
Jessen Nielsen and Sørensen, 2011). Application of such strategies and
corresponding eﬀects on WT availability have been investigated in
several publications. Availability is deﬁned as the fraction of time the
WT is producing electricity over the full duration of a certain time in-
terval or the electricity produced over the theoretically producible
electricity during a time interval (Elena Gonzalez, et al., 2017b). Stu-
dies presented in (Scheu, 2012) or (Rademakers, L and Braam, H 2003)
quantify the impact of production losses due to downtime following a
corrective maintenance strategy to around 12m€ annually for a
500MW wind farm with the direct cost for corrective maintenance
around four times the cost for preventive activities. It was understood
that preventing failures from occurring has a positive eﬀect on WT
availability and accordingly on the cash ﬂow returning from the elec-
tricity sold. Signiﬁcant eﬀorts have therefore been made to keep WTs in
an operational state to reliably produce electricity. Availability ﬁgures
rose in the following years reaching values of 95% for wind farms lo-
cated close to shore (Oﬀshore Renewable Energy Catapult, 2016) to
98% based on the authors’ industry experience. Availability depends
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on, amongst other things, the WT site conditions and technical char-
acteristics as presented in (Feng et al., 2010).
The eﬀorts made to achieve those availability ﬁgures are comprised
of preventive maintenance activities, such as scheduled replacements of
wear parts, oil or grease and responsiveness to unforeseen scenarios,
such as WT faults, by for example, having a suitable means of access
through diﬀerent types of vessels and/or helicopters as well as having
spare parts, tools and technicians readily available; a situation that is
well-known also for other oﬀshore applications such as wave energy
converters (A. Gray et al., 2017). As the industry is maturing, the
maintenance strategies as such are further developed and concepts such
as condition-based maintenance (CBM) are investigated. According to
(“EN 13306: Maintenance Terminology” 2017), CBM is a form of
“preventive maintenance which includes assessment of physical con-
ditions, analysis and the possible ensuing maintenance actions”. CBM
strategies allow for failure prevention by understanding the physics of
failure and, subsequently, the corresponding initiation of targeted
maintenance activities. Implementation of CBM requires installation of
sensors and application of analysis tools for various WT operational
signals which adds complexity and cost to the operation of a Wind
Farm. To exploit the beneﬁts of CBM, a strategy needs to be developed
that is based on a (i) thorough understanding of physics of failure and
(ii) a subsequent prioritization of WT systems.
There is yet no published literature containing an inclusive over-
view about the most critical failure modes of state-of-the-art OWTs, that
includes the rotor nacelle assembly (RNA), substructures and founda-
tions as well as their corresponding failure causes and mechanisms
based on operating track records of existing assets and design in-
formation. This information is essential for prioritization of WT systems
to assess their suitability and feasibility for incorporation of condition
monitoring systems (CMS).
This paper presents a systematic methodology for prioritization of
WT systems for the application of CBM strategies commensurate with
the most critical WT, substructure and foundation failure modes, as well
as their respective causes and failure mechanisms. The contents are
based on twelve Failure Mode Eﬀects and Criticality (FMECA) work-
shops involving experts from companies representing more than 70% of
the total installed capacity of oﬀshore wind energy in Europe. The
operating experience includes assets with a total capacity of more than
9 GW supplied from over 2500 single WTs.
The following section presents a literature review concerning CBM
and risk prioritization in the wind industry. This is followed by an ex-
planation of relevant terminology, then a methodology and a results
section including critical discussion and conclusions.
2. Literature review
2.1. Condition based maintenance in oﬀshore wind
The ﬁrst widely accepted publications concerning Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) optimization by condition monitoring date back to
the late 1990s. A comprehensive report published out of the WT-Ω
Project (Verbruggen, 2003) presented the state-of-the-art of O&M for
onshore wind applications at that time. It describes the diﬀerent mon-
itoring techniques applicable for pitch systems, gear boxes, main
bearings and blades as well as global monitoring systems, the latter
referring to an analysis of system data and alarms for detecting a de-
veloping fault. This is described later on in this section in more detail as
the applied techniques are still used today in the context of artiﬁcial
intelligence (AI). Oﬀshore wind O&M optimization was presented for
the ﬁrst time in 2005 (Caselitz and Giebhardt, 2005). This paper spe-
ciﬁcally focuses on the rotor as critical system within the wind turbine
assembly. Later, (Wilkinson et al., 2007) presented an in-depth analysis
regarding the use of condition monitoring systems on the drive train
assemblies with a particular focus on the generator. Results of the
European Union (EU) funded Condition Monitoring for Oﬀshore Wind
Farms (CONMOW) project were presented by (Wiggelinkhuizen et al.,
2008). The CONMOW project ran from 2002 to 2007 and is the suc-
cessor of the WT-Ω project. It described the use of direct and indirect
measurement techniques for early fault detection and includes on-site
application and testing of diﬀerent techniques. The application of
condition monitoring techniques has been described in a review paper
published in 2009 (Lu et al., 2009). This was followed by (Sørensen,
2009) who ﬁrstly included the factor of risk. This work was followed in
(J J Nielsen and Sørensen, 2009) focusing on the application of Baye-
sian theory as well as damage and uncertainty modelling. Like the other
referenced works, this paper underlines the potential cost savings by
moving from a corrective to a preventive maintenance approach. The
state-of-the art of acceleration- and strain-based measurement techni-
ques and algorithms is described in (Hameed et al., 2009) with a focus
on onshore applications but outlining potential beneﬁts for oﬀshore
turbines due to accessibility restrictions. More practical aspects related
to installation and testing of CMS are described in (Hameed et al.,
2010). They point out that particularly the usage of multiple interacting
solutions is a complex undertaking requiring extensive system under-
standing and programming skills. Their focus is on wind energy in
general i.e. on- and oﬀshore applications. An attempt to understand
root causes and failure prevention strategies for electrical and elec-
tronic assemblies is presented by (Peter Tavner et al., 2010). The mo-
tivation for this study were the high failure rates of the systems at the
time causing long periods of downtime, particularly oﬀshore. An in-
direct CMS, using generator power and rotational speed signals, was
investigated by (Wenxian Yang et al., 2010). This paper addresses again
the need for lowering complexity of analysing simultaneously various
signals such as direct measurements of vibrations, strains or lubrication
analyses in order to eﬃciently monitor the condition of the WT and its
systems. Calculating the remaining useful lifetime of a system by de-
riving a damage function from operating conditions and/or direct sig-
nals is described by (C. S. Gray and Watson, 2010). They suggest that
real-time damage calculation is feasible for various systems; however,
the analysis presented was only focused on the gearbox. Over the fol-
lowing years the topic of CMS received increased attention and can be
summarized in four research areas:
(1) Literature focusing on advanced O&M strategies through risk and
condition-based strategies in general;
(2) Literature focusing on the technical description of speciﬁc CMS
based on direct measurements;
(3) Literature focusing on the use of indirect signals through
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems;
(4) Review papers presenting the state-of-the-art in speciﬁc research
developments and applications.
Papers of high relevance within (1) are (El-Thalji and Jantunen,
2012), who describe challenges for implementation of CMS from an
academic and industrial perspective. The potential beneﬁt of CMS is
described by (Maples et al., 2013), who assume that 50% of the WT
faults may be detected well in advance by monitoring systems which in
turn have the potential to raise availability by 1.2%. The value of CBM
strategies was also addressed by (Van Horenbeek et al., 2013). They
conclude that CMS oﬀers cost saving potential even for onshore WTs.
However, when assessing the correlations in more detail it can be seen
that the commercial beneﬁts depend strongly on the ability of the CMS
to reliably predict a developing fault. As a follow up to their previous
papers, (J. S. Nielsen and Sørensen, 2014) propose the use of mon-
itoring information to be fed in a maintenance decision logic based on
Bayesian networks in order to reﬁne accuracy of predictions and con-
sequently optimize maintenance decision making from a risk perspec-
tive. A recent publication (Leimeister and Kolios, 2018) describes a
generic framework of qualitative and quantitative methods for fault
path investigation from a reliability perspective, providing information
of high relevance for the evaluation of the suitability of CMS.
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Work published in (2), i.e. those focusing on direct measurements,
mainly contain speciﬁc technical assessments of the applicability of
systems for monitoring the condition of (i) RNA or (ii) structural
components such as towers, substructures and foundations. Relevant
publications for components in (i) are: (Sheng et al., 2011), (Tian et al.,
2011), (Kostandyan and Sorensen, 2012), (Matthews et al., 2015),
(Romero et al., 2018), (González-González et al., 2018), (Artigao et al.,
2018a). In category (ii), focusing on substructures and foundations, the
following relevant publications have been identiﬁed (Smolka and
Cheng, 2013), (Devriendt et al., 2014), (Ziegler and Muskulus, 2016),
(Martinez-Luengo et al., 2016), (Ziegler et al., 2017), (Weijtjens et al.,
2017), (Ziegler et al., 2018). It should be noted that these papers refer
to the term ‘Structural Health Monitoring’ (SHM) which is often used as
a synonym of CMS for structural items. These references mainly address
the challenge of determining the remaining useful lifetime of oﬀshore
wind turbine (OWT) substructures and foundations with a focus on (i)
reducing the required number of inspections by maintaining an ac-
ceptable conﬁdence in structural integrity and (ii) enabling the opera-
tion of an OWT longer than its intended service life, generally referred
to as Life Time Extension (LTE).
The topic of using SCADA data for maintenance purposes (3) was
ﬁrst introduced by (Verbruggen, 2003). In recent years, from 2010
onwards, this topic has gained increased attention. These indirect data
analysis techniques are today often referred to as predictive main-
tenance. The concept was introduced to oﬀshore wind CMS by (Garcia,
Sanz-Bobi, and del Pico, 2006) and subsequently by (Kusiak and Li,
2011), (Lapira et al., 2012) and (Wenxian Yang, Court, and Jiang,
2013). From 2015 onwards, the topic has gained even more momentum
underlined by recent publications such as (Reder et al., 2016), (E
Gonzalez et al., 2016), (Colone et al., 2017), (Elena Gonzalez et al.,
2017a), (Nabati and Thoben, 2017), (E Gonzalez et al., 2018), (Dao
et al., 2018) (Arcadius Tokognon et al., 2017). First results presented
show promising potentials even though some challenges are still to be
addressed in current and futuree research. Outstanding challenges,
amongst others, are the limited number of components on which the
respective machine learning techniques are applicable to and a chal-
lenging system identiﬁcation process that potentially requires linking
SCADA data with direct measurements stemming from strain gauges or
accelerometers. On the other hand, the suggested techniques make ef-
ﬁcient use of already available measurements instead of requiring
transmission, handling, storage and analysis of new data which would
ultimately result in increased and expensive data management. This
overall trend is further reﬂected by current research activities such as
the project from which this paper has been developed (“Romeo Project”
2018).
In (4), review papers concerning CMS are presented. On average,
one paper per year is published that either focuses on one speciﬁc as-
pect or monitoring in general. The most recent are (Sharma and Mahto,
2013), (Nie and Wang, 2013), (Tchakoua et al., 2014), (Coronado and
Fischer, 2015), (Tautz-Weinert and Watson, 2017), (Wang et al., 2018),
(W. Yang, 2016). Two publications that link the aspect of risk in the
form of a Failure Mode and Eﬀect Analysis with oﬀshore wind O&M
optimization and CMS are (Shaﬁee and Dinmohammadi, 2014) and
(Zhou et al., 2015). The most comprehensive review of developments in
the ﬁeld of wind turbine reliability considering the potential value of
CMS is presented in (Artigao et al., 2018b). The latter two papers are
most relevant for this research as they investigate the problem of the
value of CMS from a risk perspective rather than on the pure techno-
logical feasibility. In other words, they investigate the likelihood and
consequence of the fault of a certain WT component or system in order
to make a judgement concerning the potential value of implementing a
certain monitoring system.
It has been shown that a great amount of work has been done to
develop, test and implement CMS/SHM systems over the past years.
The focus lies on “critical systems”, which cause long cause long periods
of downtime and high costs of failure. Furthermore, for all systems
investigated there are records of actual single or serial faults from the
ﬁeld. Thus, it can be concluded that the natural prioritization of systems
is reasonable as it focuses on systems whose failure is known to have
severe consequences, considering the view of an oﬀshore wind devel-
oper or operator. However, one may argue that a prioritization solely
based on observed scenarios may be incomplete requiring a greater
cohesive and complete system analysis for prioritization of CMS de-
velopments; therefore oﬀering improvement potential for operating
performance and maintenance eﬃciency.
One approach of doing this is to apply the concept of risk, which is
explained in more detail in the following section.
2.2. Risk prioritization and FME(C)A
The concept of risk helps to prioritize systems by assessing which
scenarios may occur (for instance, a component failure), how likely is
this to happen and what the associated consequences are. Consequences
may be evaluated in diﬀerent categories depending on the purpose of
the risk assessment. Often, they include cost and asset value implica-
tions, asset availability (as a main performance indicator), considera-
tions towards health and safety of personnel and environmental impact
(NORSOK STANDARD Z-008 2001).
Several qualitative and quantitative methods may be applied to
prioritize a system or failure scenario for further investigation. A widely
applied reference for risk assessment methodologies is the ISO 31000
series of standards (ISO31000, 2009), (ISO31010, 2010). From these
standards, the Failure Mode and Eﬀect Analysis (FMEA) is one of the
most relevant techniques for creating transparency of the failure sce-
narios with the highest relevance in the context of the operation of
physical assets. This thesis is supported by the various publications
referred to below.
A FMEA is a logical qualitative risk assessment process aimed at
evaluating failure modes (FMs) of a process, procedure or system, their
causes and eﬀects. When extended by “Criticality Analysis” (CA) for
failure modes classiﬁcation by including estimates of the likelihood and
the severity of each failure mode, it is known as Failure Mode Eﬀects
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), which is classiﬁed as a semi-quanti-
tative reliability method. It is commonly deﬁned as ‘a systematic pro-
cess for identifying potential design and process failures before they
occur, with the intent to eliminate them or minimise the risk associated
with them’ (Juhaszova, 2013). By quantitatively assessing each of the
FMs it is possible to measure their criticality, enabling their prior-
itization and subsequent identiﬁcation of appropriate mitigation mea-
sures. FME(C)A is an accepted risk assessment technique for functional
analysis as per (ISO31010, 2010), which can be applied throughout the
complete life-cycle of a physical asset from design to decommissioning.
The FMECA discipline was originally developed in the United Sates
Military and was ﬁrst formally formulated in 1949 with MIL-STD-
1629A which is reﬂected in the document referred to in (Reliability
Analysis Centre, 1993). It was used as a reliability evaluation technique
to assess the eﬀect and consequences of system or equipment failures
towards ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial aspects such as safety or the re-
putation of an organization. The technique has been in use for a long
period of time, especially in the aerospace industry with the develop-
ment of the SMC Regulation 800-31 (Jackson et al., 1995) and the
automotive industry with SAE J1739 (Surface Vehicle Standard, 2009).
However, the most widely used standard is MIL-STD-1629A which has
been applied in many industries for general failure analysis. At present,
the standards that are usually referred to when carrying out an FME
(C)A include BS EN 60812:2006 (EN 60812, 2006) and BS EN 5760-
5:1991 (British Standards Institution. 1991). For more practical gui-
dance see (Moubray, 1992).
Speciﬁcally, in the wind industry, (Shaﬁee and Dinmohammadi,
2014) presented a systematic review of maintenance optimization
methods and strategies within the oﬀshore wind industry over the past
few decades. The FMEA technique was used by (Arabian-Hoseynabadi
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et al., 2010) in evaluating an existing design of a 2MW wind turbine
with a Doubly Fed Induction Generator (DFIG) against a hypothetical
Brushless Doubly Fed Generator (BDFG), within the EU FP7 RELIAW-
IND Project (Peinke et al., 2007). It concluded that the FMEA is a
technique that could signiﬁcantly contribute to achieving long-term
cost-eﬀective systems. This project identiﬁed more than 150 diﬀerent
types of components for a wind turbine, which have been used as the
basis for WT breakdown in upcoming studies. This is similar to the work
conducted by (Gauravkumar Bharatbhai, 2015) who presented a re-
liability analysis of Repower 5MW WT by means of diﬀerent tools such
as FME(C)A. The study concluded that the overall reliability of the
5MW WT was very low, identiﬁed areas susceptible of failure and
highlighted those with the need and potential to have condition mon-
itoring systems ﬁtted. (K. Fischer et al., 2012) applied the concept of
RCM in the form of a FMECA workshop with the owner, operator and
industry experts to assess two wind turbine models Vestas V44-600 kW
and V90-2MW.
(Kahrobaee and Asgarpoor, 2011) elaborated the limitations of a
traditional FMEA or FMECA when applied to the assessment of wind
turbines. They presented a quantitative approach called Risk-Based-
FMEA based on failure probabilities and incurred failure costs and
applied this to a direct drive wind turbine case study. Similarly,
(Dinmohammadi and Shaﬁee, 2013) developed a fuzzy failure mode
and eﬀects analysis (FMEA) approach for risk and failure mode analysis
of oﬀshore wind turbine systems.
Most recently, (Kang et al., 2017) applied the FMEA method to
conduct a reliability analysis of ﬂoating oﬀshore wind turbines (FOWT).
Contrary to onshore wind turbines or bottom-ﬁxed oﬀshore wind tur-
bines FOWTs are characterised by a complex structure formed by in-
terdependent sub-systems. For this reason, an alternative FMEA method
named correlation FMEA was applied. Interestingly, the study revealed
that the foundation structure and mooring system were high-relevance
systems as a result of the many dimensions associated with potentially
severe consequence of failure. Furthermore, (Luengo and Kolios, 2015)
presented a comprehensive list of failure modes of OWT with particular
focus on end-of-life considerations.
The literature review in this section has shown that signiﬁcant re-
search has been conducted in the area of risk prioritization and risk-
based maintenance optimization. There are also some distinct papers
speciﬁcally addressing the problem of prioritizing CMS based on the
risk proﬁle of a speciﬁc system. (Zhou et al., 2015) applied an FMECA
for prioritization of CMS. They focus on representing FMECA in-
formation in an ontology in order to enable sophisticated fault diag-
nosis. The paper has a strong emphasis on information technology (IT)
and the applicability of using actual fault diagnosis techniques in op-
eration. This is also shown by the baseline scenario in which a 1MW
(Mega Watt) onshore WT is used as example. It includes failure modes
and causes for the main WT systems; however, the data provided is
limited to an onshore WT, hence does not represent the latest techno-
logical state-of-the-art and likewise does not contain information about
OWT substructures. In summary, this paper provides good insights into
how to eﬃciently use information (e.g. from an FMECA) in order to
implement fault diagnosis in an operational wind farm, but it lacks
assessing typical failure modes of latest oﬀshore wind turbines. A highly
relevant work was also published by (Artigao et al., 2018b). They use
reliability statistics and maintenance track records for assigning criti-
cality levels to WT systems in order to prioritize scenarios for CMS. This
paper is the most comprehensive literature available describing in de-
tail asset reliability of wind turbines. The study reveals however, that
availability of reliability data for oﬀshore wind is much more limited
than for onshore wind. In fact, it only refers to one study providing
reliability data for a portfolio of wind farms rather than a single array.
This study was published by (Carroll et al., 2016) and contains highly
relevant information for all those stakeholders involved in oﬀshore
wind O&M. Artigao condenses the information from Carroll's study,
including in addition twelve other publicly available reliability statis-
tics to identify the top ﬁve contributors to asset downtime (i.e. systems
with a high failure rate and/or long durations for repair or replace-
ment). The study concludes with the recommendation to focus devel-
opment eﬀorts for CMS on ﬁve systems. However, a detailed overview
concerning which failure modes any particular system should focus
upon is not included. Their study also omits the element of the foun-
dation and substructures. In oﬀshore wind, those items are subject to a
very harsh environment and achieving long-term integrity whilst
minimising the inspection and maintenance costs is crucial for in-
creasing the overall cost-eﬃciency. In order to assess the applicability
of CMS, this information is essential and it is therefore desirable to link
CMS to the failure rates and downtimes of the systems they refer to.
3. Methodology
3.1. Wind turbine system description
This paper addresses the applicability of CMS for main OWT systems
in the RNA as shown in Fig. 1 below and foundation and substructure
items. It should be noted that modern OWT often use direct drive
generators instead of a gearbox conﬁguration as shown below. For
further information on this see (Polinder et al., 2006) and (T. Fischer,
Blade
Blade
Bearing
Hub
Pitch System
Main
Shaft
Main
Bearing
Gearbox
Generator
Transformer/
Converter
Yaw
System
Fig. 1. Main systems of oﬀshore wind turbines.
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2012) for illustration and explanations of the oﬀshore substructure
concepts relevant to this study, i.e. monopile and jacket structures.
For detailed descriptions of the main wind turbine systems, sub-
assemblies and components see (Burton et al., 2001).
3.2. O&M terminology
The main WT components are subject to preventive and corrective
maintenance activities (see Fig. 2); preventive measures are intending
to avoid any fault occurrence whilst corrective measures are those ac-
tivities taking place subsequent to a component failure (“EN 13306:
Maintenance Terminology” 2017).
CMS can in general terms allow for condition-based maintenance
which in a more sophisticated approach can be translated to a pre-
dictive maintenance strategy. Predictive maintenance is deﬁned as
‘condition-based maintenance carried out following a forecast derived
from repeated analysis or known characteristics and evaluation of the
signiﬁcant parameters of the degradation of the item’ (“EN 13306:
Maintenance Terminology” 2017). This form of maintenance oﬀers
inherent optimization potential for both, preventive and corrective
maintenance activities.
A corrective maintenance strategy has the advantage that the useful
lifetime of the item is always fully utilized. This means that there is no
‘waste’ of resources caused by, e.g., a preventive replacement of the
item or parts of it. On the other hand, the disadvantages of a corrective
maintenance strategy are that (i) it relies on a quick reaction time to
avoid signiﬁcant production losses during downtime and (ii) it can
potentially cause indirect costs, e.g. if secondary damages are caused
when the item fails. The oﬀshore wind industry is moving more and
more towards preventive maintenance strategies as long periods of in-
accessibility can cause substantial ﬁnancial losses in case a wind turbine
is out of production and cannot be brought back into an operational
state.
A preventive maintenance strategy has the advantage of keeping the
asset delivering in a more constant and reliable manner electricity and
thus ensures a stable ﬁnancial income. The disadvantage of a preventive
maintenance strategy is that it comes (at least initially) at a higher cost.
Any preventive equipment check, overhaul, replacement or testing
campaign has a cost associated with it. A practicable balance must be
found between the eﬀorts put into a preventive maintenance campaign
and the risk of the component to fail. Depending on the details of the
preventive maintenance strategy, there is a possibility of over-main-
taining. This means that for example a component is replaced far earlier
than the end of its useful lifetime, which is the type of scenario that can
be avoided by applying a corrective maintenance strategy.
A way to mitigate the disadvantages of each of the above strategies
is to apply a condition-based or predictive maintenance approach.
Within either of these approaches maintenance activities are only car-
ried out when they are actually required, i.e. the item is not un-
necessarily over-maintained, but it will also not fail unexpectedly. This
is only possible if accurate information on the condition of the item and
the associated degradation mechanisms are obtained at any time.
Condition based strategies rely on information based on data
gathered by continuous or periodic, online or oﬄine condition mon-
itoring systems. It must be distinguished between diagnosis and prog-
nosis systems. The following deﬁnition can be used to diﬀerentiate
between the two: ‘Diagnosis is an assessment about the current (and
past) health of a system based on observed symptoms, and prognosis is
an assessment of the future health’ (Mathur et al., 2001).
3.3. Failure assessment and risk prioritization
While the potential beneﬁts of a CBM strategy appear obvious, a
certain eﬀort is required to develop and implement the required sys-
tems to reliably provide information about an items' current condition.
It is therefore desirable to prioritize certain components and failure
modes with respect to a potential CBM strategy rather than trying to
implement it for the entire system. A risk-based approach is deemed as
the most suitable technique for such prioritization based on the author's
industry experience and the literature review conducted on this topic.
An approach based on the FMECA methodology has been developed
and applied as explained below.
In order to gather the relevant information, a total of twelve FMECA
workshops were held involving more than 40 technical experts (me-
chanical, electrical, structural, O&M, reliability) from leading European
oﬀshore wind developers, wind turbine manufacturers, expert con-
sultancies and universities. Where applicable, data from the wind tur-
bine manufacturer's and structural design documentation, the devel-
opers or WT manufacturer's operating track-record as well as any other
relevant experience from the participants was fed into the process for
generation of the most optimal and representative results covering the
diﬀerent viewpoints of the stakeholders. The process followed is pre-
sented in Fig. 3 below. The ﬁrst author of this paper has acted as
workshop leader, i.e. the workshop preparation and moderation were in
his responsibility. The participants of the workshops were selected in
accordance with the requirements for experience within each ﬁeld.
Relevant industry experience of 5 + years was the general requirement;
but most of the participants were signiﬁcantly more experienced. Due
to privacy protection reasons, further detail on the participant's proﬁles
is omitted.
The ﬁrst step was to divide the assets under consideration into
systems and components. An RDS-PP (Reference Designation System for
Power Plants (“VGB-Standard RDS-PP ® Application Guideline Part 32:
Wind Power Plants” 2014)) structure was used to organize the system
breakdown in accordance with the equipment's functional location
(FLOC). This process was conducted considering the wind turbine
manufacturer and end user requirements.
In step 2 the description of the main function was added to each
item. This description reﬂects the main design intention and helps at a
later stage to assess eﬀects and consequences of a functional failure.
The failure mode, as documented in step 3, contains information
about the event which causes a functional failure. In basic terms it
answers the: “what happens” question (not to be confused with the
failure cause) (European Standard 14224 2006).
The failure cause describes what made the failure mode to occur
(not to be confused with the failure mechanism) (European Standard
Maintenance
Preventive
Predetermined Condition based
Corrective
Immediate Deferred
Fig. 2. Maintenance types (“EN 13306: Maintenance Terminology” 2017).
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14224 2006). This is documented in step 4 in order to be able to
document the likeliest root causes of the failure mode under con-
sideration.
In the next question, answered in step 5, the information about the
likelihood of a failure scenario to occur is documented. The likelihood
of occurrence assessment is a vital part of any risk assessment.
Generally, the likelihood of occurrence (or probability of occurrence)
can be assessed quantitatively, semi-quantitatively or qualitatively.
Quantitative and semi-quantitative approaches are applicable if there is
an operating track record available of the item under consideration
providing statistically viable information; i.e. the information about an
items’ reliability can be obtained from actual data records. This ap-
proach is not applicable for items which have been in operation for a
short period of time. Therefore, qualitative engineering judgment was
used for the assessment of the likelihood of occurrence of the given
scenarios. The mentioned judgments were supported by numerical
calculations, other modelling techniques, or experience from other
ﬁelds of application of a similar technology where possible. Within this
research project, the assets under consideration are of diﬀering ages;
i.e. for some assets, an operating track record of several years is
available, whereas others have been in operation only for a relatively
short period of time or not even built. Due to this diﬀering character-
istic, a qualitative assessment approach has been chosen for the like-
lihood of occurrence evaluation. Table 1 summarizes the three levels
that have been used:
The failure end eﬀect, documented in step 6, describes what hap-
pens when a failure mode occurs (not to be confused with failure
consequence) (Moubray, 1992). It is this scenario which is assessed in
terms of consequence in subsequent steps. The failure eﬀect description
shall consider the realistic worst-case scenario.
In step 7, the β-factor is analysed and documented. The β-factor
represents the conditional probability of the failure end eﬀect
(described in step 6) to materialize, given that the failure mode has
already occurred. It is used to account for the failure progression mi-
tigation measures which would prevent the end eﬀect to occur in case
of failure mode occurrence. The categories that have been considered in
the course of the ROMEO project are presented in Table 2.
In step 8, the consequence of the described failure end eﬀect is as-
sessed. This step describes why and how a scenario matters. Diﬀerent
consequence categories were deﬁned in accordance with the project
requirements and industry-standard practices; they encompass ‘Safety’,
‘Environment’, ‘Spare Part Cost’, ‘Production Availability’ and ‘Type of
Intervention’. Three consequence levels were introduced in each cate-
gory, representing their respective severity categorization; ‘Marginal’,
‘Medium’ and ‘Critical’.
Consequences are assessed per individual asset; i.e. per one wind
turbine and its individual systems. Park (array/full-system) eﬀects,
scale eﬀects, etc. are not considered in this assessment.
Economic consequences are split into direct and indirect cost, with
the latter referring to production losses. This split allows for the iden-
tiﬁcation of items which may be repairable at low cost, but potentially
having a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on availability vice versa. In addition,
there is a distinction between the types of intervention required in order
to account for the impact of specialised resources and logistics required
to carry out certain activities.
The realistic failure end eﬀect of a scenario is assessed with respect
to the consequence levels; each carrying the same weight in the as-
sessment (weighted factoring is omitted here, i.e. eventual weighting
shall be reﬂected by the categorization). Consequence groups and levels
were agreed upon in the expert forum involved in this project, as re-
ferred to earlier. They reﬂect the particular risk appetite of this speciﬁc
group of experts and, therefore, have potential for adjustment. Risk
analysis consequence groups and levels are summarized in Table 3
below.
Item
Function
Failure Mode
Failure Cause
Likelihood
Failure Effect
-Factor
1
2
3
4
7
6
5
Criticality9Consequence8
Value 44
or greater?
Not Prioritized
Failure Mechanism10
Current Regime11
Monitoring Options12
Improvement Potential13
No
Yes
Fig. 3. Process for FMECA and prioritization of CMS.
Table 1
Likelihood of occurrence categorization.
Category Description Factor
Not expected The occurrence of the described failure mode is not expected throughout the planned lifetime of the asset and under consideration of the current
inspection or maintenance regime.
1
Possible The failure mode could occur throughout the planned asset lifetime but it is not certain. 2
High This failure mode would, under the given inspection and maintenance regime, certainly occur. 3
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The criticality value is calculated in step 9. The criticality value
provides a quantiﬁed result combining the earlier collected information
about the potential failure mode, the likelihood of occurrence and β-
factor as well as the consequences of the eﬀect. The formula used for
the calculation of the criticality is given below. This formula relies on
the values denoted as ‘Factor’ as listed in the tables above, i.e. a value of
1–3 representing the likelihood of occurrence, the β-factor and the se-
verity summation.
∑= ∗ ∗Criticality Likelihood β Severity( )
The combined result is a value between 5 and 135. For risk eva-
luation purposes, the following categorization, presented in Table 4,
was discussed among the forum of industry experts and reﬂects the
common understanding of acceptable boundaries. It should be noted
however, that these values or classes ultimately depend on the risk
appetite of stakeholders and therefore may change (see Table 5).
All failure modes which were either in the medium or high-risk
category were prioritized and have been further assessed as part of steps
10 to 13.
In step 10, the failure mechanisms of any prioritized failure mode
were analysed by in-depth evaluation of the physical, chemical or other
processes leading to the failure. This information forms the basis for
establishing a list of desirable monitoring systems and their require-
ments.
Steps 10 to 13 were carried out separately for structures and RNA.
This is because structures (here monopile and jacket substructures) are
handled diﬀerently to the turbine main systems (here blades, pitch
system, yaw system, main shaft, gearbox, generator, transformer and
converter) during the operational phase of a wind farm. In general
terms, structures are subject to an inspection and monitoring regime
aimed to verify their structural integrity is maintained throughout the
intended lifetime of the asset. Wind turbine RNA components are, on
the other hand, predominantly subject to regular maintenance cam-
paigns which ensure that the components and systems are ﬁt for their
desired purpose. This main diﬀerence is respected by following speciﬁc
measures in the course of the FMECA process.
3.4. Benchmarking of wind turbine RNA component monitoring options
A common method to evaluate the performance of a monitoring
system is the PF-interval. This is deﬁned as the time interval between
the detection of a developing fault and the failure occurrence, as illu-
strated in Fig. 4 below. This example shows a ﬁctitious component with
a certain performance requirement. As soon as the performance falls
below the required value, the component is considered to be in a failed
state. This represents the F of the PF-interval. A and B represent mea-
surements derived from condition monitoring systems. In this particular
example, A is capable of detecting the fault development at time P1 and
B is capable of detecting the failure at time P2. The interval between the
potential fault detection PX and the actual fault F is deﬁned as PF-in-
terval.
The PF-interval is used as a performance indicator for condition
monitoring systems. The longer this interval is and the more accurately
the exact point in time of failure occurrence can be estimated, the more
beneﬁts can be obtained by applying the system. For prioritization of
monitoring systems for main turbine components, the PF-interval
achievable with contemporary commercially available monitoring sys-
tems has been compared with the potential PF-interval of any imagin-
able monitoring system. This is done by following the process shown
below.
• Describe any currently used monitoring system for the failure me-
chanism under consideration.
• Estimate the PF-interval achievable with the monitoring system
applied today.
• Describe how a future monitoring system could look like and what
its performance criteria are.
Table 2
β-factor categorization.
Category Description Factor
Low The described failure end eﬀect will most likely not materialize if this failure mode occurs. There are several mitigation or detection measures in place which
will prevent the fault to progress to the worst-case eﬀect.
1
Medium The failure mode could progress to the described failure end eﬀect, but it is not certain. In most cases, the end eﬀect will not materialize. 2
High The failure mode described will certainly lead to the described failure end eﬀect. 3
Table 3
Consequence categories and levels for criticality analysis.
Consequence
Marginal Medium Critical
Production
Availability
< 3 days 3 day < downtime <7 days 7 days < downtime
Personal Safety No potential for injuries. No eﬀect on safety
systems.
Potential injuries requiring medical
treatment. Limited eﬀect on safety systems.
Potential for serious personnel injuries or fatality.
Environment No impact. Contained release requiring only
simple clean up. No need for reporting to
local environmental agencies.
No impact. Contained release requiring
response from trained team.
No need for reporting to local environmental
agencies.
Impairment of ecosystems function. Uncontained
release. Event needs to be reported to local
environmental agencies.
Spare Part Cost 0–7.5 k€ 7.5–100 k€ >100 k€
Type of Intervention Minor campaign – 1 CTV, SOV or helicopter
mobilization and use for up to 1 day, 3 or less
technicians
Medium campaign – 1 CTV, SOV or
helicopter mobilization and use for up to 7
days, 6 or less technicians
Major campaign – 1 CTV, SOV or helicopter
mobilization and use for more than 7 days, 1 jack-up
vessel mobilization and use for min 1 day
Factor 1 2 3
Table 4
Risk evaluation categories.
Category Range
Low 5–43
Medium 44–90
High 90–135
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• Estimate the potential cost savings achievable by applying the new
monitoring system.
• Estimate the expected downtime reduction by applying the new
monitoring system.
Points (4) and (5) are assessed based on the same levels used in step
8 of the criticality assessment, i.e. three levels for cost savings and three
levels for downtime reduction.
A second prioritization is then performed based on the calculated
beneﬁts for the speciﬁc monitoring system. The respective categories
used in the context of this project are provided in Table 6 below and
reﬂect the judgement of the industry experts involved in this research
project (see Tables 7-11).
Any evaluation of the ‘medium’ and ‘high’ categories represents an
improvement over the current status. It should be noted that not all
critical failure modes have been assessed in such level of detail. This
caveat applied in those cases where the respective scenario was already
covered by another measure or for those where the failure mechanism
did not show any degradation pattern (sudden failure) and, therefore,
was not considered suitable for monitoring.
3.5. Benchmarking of substructure structural monitoring options
An alternative method to assess the potential of a substructure
monitoring system is proposed as the PF-interval concept used for the
wind turbine RNA components has limited applicability for this parti-
cular system and components. Firstly, the FMECA results were reviewed
and all relevant failure modes extracted. The next step consisted of an
analysis of these failure modes and a review of the failure mechanism
from root cause to failure mode, with the objective of assessing the
potential for monitoring based on known damage mechanisms prior to
failure.
A benchmark study of substructure monitoring systems was then
performed. This study focused on those mechanisms that take suﬃcient
time before a failure materialises, hence allow suﬃcient time to react
and plan for maintenance mobilization/failure prevention or mitiga-
tion. A number of ﬁve core questions were formulated to assess the
suitability of monitoring systems for each of the previously identiﬁed
structural failure modes and mechanisms. The questions are:
• Can the inspection frequency be reduced?
• Can the inspection depth/extent be reduced?
• Is it possible to defer unplanned maintenance activities?
• Is an update of structural capacity enabled?
• Can secondary damages be mitigated or prevented by applying a
monitoring system?
The scope of the study was narrowed down to cover primary
structural items, i.e. the main items with the function to provide
structural integrity and load bearing capacity throughout the lifetime.
Also, the scope focused on the submerged section of those primary
structural items. This is the area of most interest as any inspection ac-
tivity in this environment is very costly and generally poses an in-
creased risk to personal safety (particularly if divers are used. The ﬁve
questions listed above were answered by the forum of technical experts
during the workshops by a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. A ‘yes’ infers an im-
provement compared to the current situation while a ‘no’ refers to no
improvement. If a monitoring system was judged to not improving the
situation compared to today, it did not qualify for further assessment.
4. Results
4.1. Overview
A presentation of the main observations made during the im-
plementation of the FMECA process outlined above is provided in this
section. Fig. 5 shows an overview of the overall distribution of identi-
ﬁed failure modes for each of the main systems within the scope of the
project. The largest proportion is related to the substructure, i.e. ap-
proximately one third of the 337 failures identiﬁed fall into this
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Fig. 4. PF-Interval example.
Table 5
Beneﬁts of monitoring categorization.
Level
Low Medium High
Downtime
Reduction
< 3 days 3 day < downtime <7
days
7 days < downtime
Cost Savings 0–7.5 k€ 7.5–100 k€ >100 k€
Factor 1 2 3
Table 6
Monitoring beneﬁt categories.
Category Range
Low 2
Medium 3–4
High 5–6
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category. One reason for this may be that the analysis has been done for
the speciﬁc purpose of identifying areas that would potentially proﬁt
from the application of monitoring systems. Looking deeper into the
failure modes assessed for substructures, it can be seen that all of them
are related to submerged items. Those items are by nature rather dif-
ﬁcult to be inspected so that a tendency for prioritizing them for
monitoring can be interpreted as the natural reaction of the experts
involved. The second most common failure modes are related to the
transformer; both systems together make up almost half of all failure
modes. The remaining main systems carry each a comparable weight
with values of 16–30 failure modes per item. The pitch system is the
smallest contributor of the investigated failure modes with only 5
failure modes. This can be justiﬁed by the fact that this system was
initially not part of the scope of work; therefore, the focus was rather
limited if compared to the predominating failure modes of the rotor
system.
The distribution of the overall system criticality is shown in Fig. 6
below. The graph shows the number of failure modes rated with the
corresponding criticality value on the horizontal axis. Most of the
failure modes are in the medium region (approx. 30); a peak of critical
items can be observed towards the right of the ﬁgure, from 54 onwards.
As described in the methodology section, only those failure modes
with criticality values greater or equal than 44 have been prioritized.
Fig. 7 shows the proportion of criticality numbers per system in this
criticality region. The overall result looks comparable to Fig. 6; how-
ever, the transformer system, the converter and the blade bearings
show now a slightly higher number of critical failure modes when
compared to the other systems.
The critical failure modes (FM), including a description of their
likely cause and mechanism and potential beneﬁt for monitoring ca-
tegory, are presented in the following sections. Since several failure
causes may lead to the same failure mode, some of the tables presented
contain repetitions of the same failure mode. Since the presentation of
all potential failure paths needs to be assessed for evaluating the suit-
ability of a monitoring system, also the paths resulting to the same
failure modes have been included and are presented.
4.2. Blades
Four of the blade system failure modes have been prioritized for
further investigation of monitoring systems. One FM is related to in-
correct application of adhesives and is therefore not assessed in more
detail with respect to a possible CBM strategy. Of the remaining three,
monitoring of cracks and delamination could provide high value,
whereas top coat damage and delamination caused by design errors
would not be relevant and therefore, be prevented by the application of
monitoring during operation.
4.3. Blade bearings
Five out of six identiﬁed critical failure modes could beneﬁt from
the application of monitoring systems. All of them are related to ma-
terial failures that show a time dependency: fatigue and wear. Several
monitoring techniques may be investigated to detect developing fail-
ures based on those mechanisms well in advance, respecting the dif-
ferent potential main causes.
4.4. Pitch system
Only one critical failure mode, namely “wear of the pitch gears”, has
been identiﬁed. A potential monitoring system was, however, not as-
sessed. The current most common maintenance strategy is run-to-
failure and a monitoring system was not deemed beneﬁcial.
4.5. Main shaft
A large number of failure modes have been identiﬁed for the main
shaft, where also the main bearing is considered. The bearing assess-
ment is similar to the blade bearing assessment; i.e. a signiﬁcant im-
provement over present practice can be achieved by the use of mon-
itoring systems. Other potential failure modes of the main shaft, such as
excessive vibration, leakages or fabrication issues are not expected to
have an improvement over the current situation.
4.6. Gearbox
Four monitoring systems would potentially improve the PF-interval
Table 7
Prioritized failure modes of blades.
Failure Mode Cause Mechanism Beneﬁt
Cracks and delamination Manufacturing error Material failure - Crack opening/delamination/local stress concentrations/
out-of-plane loading conditions
High
Cracks/de-bonding on
bonding line
Incorrect adhesive application (lack, inclusion, porosity)
– related to manufacturing
Not assessed N/A
Top coat damage Underestimation of impact by objects (e.g. birds). Also
during transport and installation handling (design error)
Mechanical failure - Crack opening/delamination/local stress
concentrations/out-of-plane loading conditions
Medium
Delamination Insuﬃcient lightning protection (design error) Material failure - Sudden delamination/crack (similar to impact). Thermal
expansion (very fast). Failure mechanism of lightning guidance system is
degradation of material.
Medium
Table 8
Prioritized failure modes of blade bearings.
Failure Mode Cause Mechanism Beneﬁt
Fatigue fracture of raceways Microgeometry (load zones not properly designed), local overload Material failure, local overload causing fatigue High
Fatigue fracture of ball Microgeometry (load zones not properly designed), local overload Material failure, local overload causing fatigue High
Wear of ball Insuﬃcient material quality (fabrication related) Material failure, wear out High
Wear of cages Shape/roughness inadequately designed Material failure, wear out High
Loss of structural integrity Insuﬃcient material quality (fabrication related) Material failure causing fatigue High
Wear of raceways Lack of grease (O&M related) Material failure caused by wear out Low
Table 9
Prioritized failure modes of pitch system.
Failure Mode Cause Mechanism Beneﬁt
Wear out of gear Design error Material failure, wear out Low
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of the prioritized FMs of the gearbox compared to today. The failure
mechanisms to be detected cover diﬀerent fatigue and wear processes
as well as various temperature related eﬀects.
4.7. Generator
Signiﬁcant improvements in the current operation and maintenance
of the generator system can be achieved by means of monitoring. Nine
mechanisms have been assessed in detail and all of them rank the
highest when assessing their impact on PF-intervals. The failure me-
chanisms cover material degradation and overheating as well as me-
chanical failures related to vibration and electrical faults related to
isolation. Speciﬁcally, monitoring the latter electrical failure mechan-
isms is considered a great improvement to today.
4.8. Transformer
The largest number of failure modes has been identiﬁed and
prioritized for transformer systems. The failure modes and mechanisms
are to a large extent comparable to those identiﬁed for the generator,
i.e. related to material and electrical faults. However, there are limited
possibilities to monitor speciﬁc failure modes of the transformer, which
leads to further consideration of only two failure modes as having large
improvement potential.
4.9. Converter
Improvement potential is expected for three out of the seven iden-
tiﬁed failure modes in the converter system. Two are related to material
failure mechanisms which are expected to have detectable degradation
patterns over time. The other one relates to an electrical short circuit,
which could also be detected early by analysing simultaneously tem-
perature, current and voltage signals.
4.10. Yaw system
Only one out of the seven identiﬁed and prioritized failure modes of
the yaw system is deemed to oﬀer a signiﬁcant improvement potential.
This relates to defects in the yaw motor or yaw gear, which may be
detected remotely by automatic data analysis methods. Other failure
Table 10
Prioritized failure modes of main shaft.
Failure Mode Cause Mechanism Beneﬁt
Fatigue of raceways or roller Microgeometry (load zones not properly
manufactured), local overload
Material failure, local overload causing fatigue High
Wear of roller or raceways Microgeometry (load zones not properly designed),
local overload
Material failure, wear out High
Wear of raceways Lack of lubrication oil (O&M related) Material failure, wear out High
Excessive vibration Insuﬃcient material quality (general) Material failure, micro pitting Low
Excessive vibration Standstill marks due to long downtime (O&M related) Mechanical failure, stress concentrations, vibrations, false
brinelling
Low
Fatigue of rollers, raceways or cages Insuﬃcient material quality of items (fabrication
related)
Material failure, local overload causing fatigue Low
Wear (structural deﬁciency of rollers, raceways
or cages)
Insuﬃcient material quality of items (fabrication
related)
Material failure, wear out Low
Wear (structural deﬁciency of rollers, raceways
or cages)
Lightning protection system undermaintained (O&M
related)
Mechanical, burn marks on rollers and raceways due to
current ﬂow, increased wear
Low
Wear (structural deﬁciency of rollers, raceways
or cages)
Standstill marks on the raceways (O&M related) Mechanical - Stress concentrations, vibrations, false
brinelling
Low
Leakage of lubrication system Failed couplings (design related) Mechanical failure, breakage Low
Failure to start on demand (no grease supply or
broken pump)
Electrical failure (O&M related) Electrical failure Low
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Fig. 5. Number of failure modes for identiﬁed for main systems.
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mechanisms may also be monitored; however, the impact in respect to
PF-interval improvement is deemed limited.
4.11. Jacket and monopile support structure
The results show that all assessed and prioritized failure modes in
the substructure system have the potential for improvement if com-
pared to their current situation as of today in the event monitoring
systems are applied successfully. The total beneﬁt-rating for each
failure mode gives an indication on the overall impact and beneﬁt of
the monitoring application for the assessed failure mechanism.
Generally, the greatest impact resulting from the application of
monitoring systems is deemed to be achieved in the mitigation or
prevention of secondary damages (84%). This is followed by the pos-
sibility of providing the basis structural capacity update (68%) and
deferment of unplanned maintenance activities (64%). Approximately
50% of the assessed failure modes will beneﬁt from a reduction in the
substructure inspection frequency and the inspection extent (refer to
section 3.5 for further details).
5. Discussion
A risk-based approach has been applied to prioritize OWT systems
for analysing the potential value of implementing a CBM strategy. This
is based upon extensive expert experience but also long-term operating
track records of a large proportion of all wind farms located in
European seas.
A comparison study with diﬀerent other publicly available risk-
prioritization studies for WT systems has been carried out to enable
investigation of any possible diﬀerences that could arise from the par-
ticular focus of study, the diﬀerent data and knowledge bases.
Table 17 shows risk priority of the diﬀerent studies. For this paper,
study (1), the number of critical failure modes identiﬁed for each
system has been documented. This number reﬂects the focus for CMS
developments, which has been the main objective of the FMECA con-
ducted for achieving those results. In (Kang et al., 2017), study (2), the
focus is on system reliability of ﬂoating OWTs. The authors intend to
identify interconnections between systems to improve overall system
reliability. In (Gauravkumar Bharatbhai, 2015), study (3), the focus is
somewhat similar, except that this study is speciﬁcally done for a 5MW
OWT on a bottom-ﬁxed substructure. A risk analysis and failure mode
prioritization is presented in study (4) by (Kougioumtzoglou and
Lazakis, 2015), looking at the optimization of O&M of oﬀshore WT
systems. Study (5), presented in (Dinmohammadi and Shaﬁee, 2013),
attempts to solve some weaknesses of conventional FMEAs by in-
troducing fuzzy logic. The ﬁnal aim of this study was to improve system
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reliability and to optimize maintenance by using any possible data
input, such as expert opinions but also SCADA data. Study (6), pre-
sented in (Kahrobaee and Asgarpoor, 2011), focuses on failure eﬀect
mitigation by thorough understanding of system failure modes and
causes. This study was applied to an onshore WT system. Study (7),
presented in (Arabian-Hoseynabadi et al., 2010) focuses on system
Table 11
Prioritized failure modes of gearbox.
Failure Mode Cause Mechanism Beneﬁt
Wear of raceways Lack of lubrication oil Material failure, fatigue Low
Wear of roller Microgeometry (load zones not properly designed), local overload Material failure, fatigue High
Blockage Lack of lubrication on that local area Material failure, wear out High
Cracks in gear Material inclusion, ﬂaws Material failure, fatigue High
Cracking Insuﬃcient material quality of items Material failure, micro pitting, cracking, crack development Low
Insuﬃcient oil cooling Multiple causes (pump, valve, etc.) Miscellaneous Various temperature-related eﬀects Medium
Table 12
Prioritized failure modes of generator.
Failure Mode Cause Mechanism Beneﬁt
Too low magnetization-demagnetized Underestimation of operating temperature (design related) Material failure, overheating High
Too low magnetization-demagnetized Overestimation of magnet performance lifetime (design related) General material failure High
Magnet detachment General fabrication error Not assessed N/A
Loss of insulation in the winding Insuﬃcient retainment capacity of the winding (design related) Electrical failure, earth/isolation fault High
Loss of insulation in the winding Insulation degradation due to manufacturing/installation quality issues Electrical failure, earth/isolation fault High
Loss of insulation in the winding Insulation degradation due to oﬀ design service (e.g.: power throughput too
high)
Electrical failure, earth/isolation fault High
Electrical failure of windings (loss of insulation) Ageing of insulation material due to insuﬃcient design Material failure, degradation High
Electrical failure of windings (loss of insulation) Vibration in structural elements supporting the coils is underestimated
(design related)
Mechanical failure, vibration High
Electrical failure of windings Manufacturing quality insuﬃcient Material failure, accelerated aging High
Insuﬃcient cooling Multiple causes (ventilator, etc.). Random electrical failure (fabrication
related)
Miscellaneous - Overheating N/A
Table 13
Prioritized failure modes of transformer.
Failure Mode Cause Mechanism Beneﬁt
Broken Material not properly selected – design error Not assessed N/A
Broken Insuﬃcient isolating distance – design error Not assessed N/A
Broken Incorrect loading assumption – design error Not assessed N/A
Broken Installation error Not assessed N/A
Loss of insulating properties Maintenance error Not assessed N/A
Broken tank Underestimation of oil pressure – design error Material failure, overload and breakage N/A
Broken tank Fabrication error Material failure, overload and breakage N/A
Broken tank Operated out of service Material failure, overload and breakage N/A
Compromised structural integrity to keep the core
in place
Insuﬃcient capacity to deal with static and dynamic loads Material failure, local overload causing
fatigue
Medium
Compromised structural integrity to keep the core
in place
Out of tolerance manufacturing Material failure, local overload causing
fatigue
Medium
Loss of insulation in the winding Insulation degradation due to manufacturing/installation quality
issues
Electrical failure, earth/isolation fault Medium
Loss of insulation in the winding Insulation degradation due to oﬀ design service (e.g.: power
throughput too high)
Electrical failure, earth/isolation fault Medium
Loss of insulation in the winding Overestimation of insulation performance lifetime Electrical failure, earth/isolation fault Medium
Compromised structural integrity to keep the core
in place
Insuﬃcient capacity to resist static and dynamic loads Material failure, local overload causing
fatigue
High
Compromised structural integrity to keep the core
in place
Out of tolerance manufacturing Material failure, local overload causing
fatigue
High
Insuﬃcient cooling Multiple causes (ventilator, etc.). Random electrical failure Miscellaneous failures, overheating N/A
Table 14
Prioritized failure modes of converter.
Failure Mode Cause Mechanism Beneﬁt
Degradation General fabrication errors Material failure, chemical composition inside capacitor changes Medium
Degradation Fabrication errors/polluted microchips Electrical failure, short circuit Medium
Broken soldering of parts to the PCB Fabrication errors/bad soldering Electrical failure, open or short circuit N/A
Failed deionization Expected wear and tear Material failure, electrochemical corrosion N/A
Electrical failure Fabrication error (e.g.: polluted microchips, etc.) Electrical failure, short circuit N/A
Electrical failure Fabrication error Material, failure in component behaviour Medium
Insuﬃcient cooling Multiple causes (ventilator, etc.). Random electrical failure Miscellaneous failure, overheating Low
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reliability improvement of future designs of onshore WTs (see Tables
12-16).
It should be noted that system topology is not consistent throughout
the studies. This is reﬂected by zeros in the table below, meaning that a
speciﬁc item may have been included in study X but not in study Y. The
items were grouped into subassemblies and systems as appropriate and
in accordance with industry practice. In all cases, the total sum of in-
dividual contributors totals 100%.
Towers and substructures account for almost one third of all critical
failure modes identiﬁed in the course of this paper. This number is
unprecedented in the context of the literature available in this subject
area. In studies (2), (3), (6) and (7), this category contributes less than
10% of the critical FMs, whereas the contribution is rather signiﬁcant in
studies (4) and (5) which have a strong focus on O&M optimization of
OWT. Studies (2) and (3) focus on system reliability; studies (6) and (7)
deal with onshore wind applications and therefore do not contain the
critical submerged area that is mostly associated with the critical FMs
identiﬁed in this study. It can therefore be concluded that studies
focusing on O&M and condition monitoring account more for structural
FMs than those focused on system reliability or onshore wind applica-
tions.
The second highest priority for CMS developments is related to the
transformer system. This system is identiﬁed as somewhat critical in
study (2), however not at the magnitude reported in this present paper.
The other studies either did not include the transformer in their as-
sessment, or this system did not contribute signiﬁcantly to the most
critical FMs. It should be noted that some studies refer to converter and
transformer in one system. But even if this would be the case for all
studies, this assembly would not be in the foremost position of risk
priority.
A particular observation is made for the generator system of study
(2). With more than 40%, this system is the most signiﬁcant in study
(2). From the original paper, it appears that this is due to the speciﬁc
nature of FOWT application (Kang et al., 2017). Interestingly, the
generator is a top risk also for the onshore-speciﬁc studies number (6)
and (7). Furthermore, main shaft and bearing are included in the
Table 15
Prioritized failure modes of yaw system.
Failure Mode Cause Mechanism Beneﬁt
Leakages of the hydraulic system Speciﬁcation of ﬁttings insuﬃcient (design related) Not assessed N/A
Leakages of the hydraulic system Fittings installed out of tolerance Not assessed N/A
Electrical failure Overheating (O&M related) Degradation accelerated by overheating, decrease insulation aging,
wearing
Low
Electrical failure Overheating (O&M related) Overheating due to high continuous load on the yaw motor due to
wind loads
N/A
Leakage of lubrication system Failed couplings Breakage Low
Electrical failure Currently unclear Defect Motor and/or yaw gear Medium
Faulty signal Undesired misalignment of the sensor during maintenance
works
External impact on the sensor Low
Table 16
Prioritized failure modes of substructure.
Failure Mode Cause Mechanism Beneﬁt
Excessive Corrosion Design Insuﬃcient cathodic protection (electric potential), Medium
Fatigue Design Underestimation of wind turbine loads, environmental conditions and operational conditions e.g.
extreme events, grid faults (Jacket)
High
Design Underestimation of marine growth Medium
Fabrication and
Installation
Earlier crack initiation and crack growth/propagation through cyclic loading (acoustic) Medium
Operation and
Maintenance
Scour protection damage, scour depth increased, degradation excessive loading Medium
Operation and
Maintenance
ICCP system reference cell is broken and gives wrong values, under protection, corrosion (hot
redundancy of reference cell provides correct electrical potential)
Medium
Design ICCP system in place, ventilation system for compartment faulty, H2 is exceeding allowed
concentration, material becomes brittle, crack initiation and growth accelerated.
Medium
Design Underestimation of wind turbine loads, environmental conditions and operational conditions e.g.
extreme events, grid faults (Monopile)
Medium
Fabrication and
Installation
Excessive fatigue life consumption/loading during handling at fabrication site, during shipping
and during installation (CMS in place before operational phase)
Low
Deformation, Buckling, Displacement
of steel
Design Overestimation of soil capacity, soil degradation, pile displacement rotation High
Design Underestimation of environmental and operational condition, excessive loading, buckling, crack
formation
Medium
Operation and
Maintenance
Scour degradation, scour depth increased, excessive displacement of scour material Medium
Grouted Connection MP/TP Fabrication and
Installation
Loss of hard material, water ingress in porous material, sliding (LVDT) of grout against steel High
Design Loss of hard material, water ingress in porous material, sliding of grout against steel High
Design Excessive loads and displacement, de-bonding/lack of contact between steel and grout, sliding High
Fabrication and
Installation
Failed grout seal, leakage/over spilling, volume of grout is insuﬃcient, reduced capacity in
connection, global dynamics changed
Medium
Fabrication and
Installation
Improper thermal environment during installation/curing process, reduced capacity of grout,
global dynamics changed
Medium
Fabrication and
Installation
Eccentricity during installation caused reduced capacity at one side of the MP/TP connection.
global dynamics changed
Medium
Broken bolted connection Design Poorly speciﬁed pretension force, loosening of connection at one bolt, more bolts to loosen Medium
Operation and
Maintenance
Internal climate control broken, high humidity, corrosive environment Low
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generator assembly in Kang's study which explains the rather high risk
priority number. With around one quarter of the critical FMs, the drive
train components consisting of main shaft, main bearing, gearbox and
generator are still deemed a critical assembly in this study which is in
accordance with earlier studies.
The blade assembly does not contribute signiﬁcantly to the critical
failure modes in this study; however, it carries some weight in the
onshore studies (6) and (7) as well as in a former oﬀshore study (5). It
appears as if the respective FMs are well covered by O&M technology,
such as sensors, in more recent applications. The same reasoning ap-
plies to the pitch system, which is less of a focus in this study, but
contributes signiﬁcantly to critical FMs in earlier studies, particularly
number (3) and (4), which relate to improved O&M and system relia-
bility.
Overall, the referred studies have a similar proﬁle; however, this
paper in particular emphasises the potential of CMS developments for
substructures and foundations as well as transformer systems and the
main shaft (including main bearing). It is found that the proposed
methodology ensures that (i) expert knowledge, (ii) operating track
records and (iii) design information is used collectively – enabling a
comprehensive all-encompassing transparent system analysis.
Development eﬀorts for condition monitoring systems can in this
manner be targeted towards the most critical systems.
It may be argued, however, that costs for developing and im-
plementing monitoring systems are not included in this study which
makes it diﬃcult to assess the cost-eﬀectiveness in the long-term of
such systems. It may also be argued that the results presented only
compare the state-of-the-art (i.e. what is currently been done) and the
application of condition monitoring. Other strategies, such as increased
eﬀorts for predetermined preventive maintenance for instance, are not
considered in the assessment. Such strategies may lead to a diﬀerent
risk prioritization that could eliminate or mitigate some of the failure
modes prioritized in this study. Regarding both points, it should be
noted that the objective of this study is to provide an un-biased and
realistic risk analysis of wind turbine systems. For each speciﬁc failure
mode, a number of diﬀerent ways forward can be considered based on
the results obtained in the analysis. This study has considered the de-
velopment of a monitoring solution for speciﬁc, prioritized failure
modes. Such a development should be preceded by a comprehensive
evaluation of the opportunities and limitations of all possible options
for failure mode treatment. This should be supported by a thorough cost
analysis in order to assess the impact of each of the options in a fully
transparent manner.
6. Conclusion
This paper presents the most critical failure modes of state-of-the-art
oﬀshore wind turbine systems. Each failure mode is investigated con-
sidering the opportunity to optimize O&M (less inspections or higher
PF-interval) through the application of condition monitoring systems.
Failure causes and mechanisms are evaluated in order to establish the
degradation patterns that may be potentially identiﬁed by a monitoring
system. A total of 337 individual failure modes have been identiﬁed and
analysed by a consortium representing more than 70% of the total
oﬀshore wind capacity installed in Europe today. Results were to some
extent in accordance with other studies; however, a particular potential
for monitoring of substructures and foundations as well as transformer
systems and the main shaft (including main bearing) has been identi-
ﬁed. Further work involves the prioritization of all failure modes to be
followed by the development of diagnosis and prognosis tools to be
implemented in pilot tests at the Teesside, Wikinger and East Anglia
Oﬀshore Wind Farms.
This study provides the reader with a structured and transparent,
risk-based assessment methodology that helps optimize O&M and to
minimise operational expenditure. It further provides detailed in-
formation about the paths leading to critical failure modes. Those paths
must be understood in order to properly design targeted and useful
condition monitoring systems. As a ﬁrst of its kind, this paper draws
upon extensive operating experience, making the methodology and
results highly applicable to the industry.
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